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This past February I had an experience that was once all but ubiquitous for
travelers to and from Ireland and North America, the Shannon stopover.  The
compulsory deplaning accomplished, I found myself in the spiritual home of Duty
Free Shopping, examining the miniature High Crosses of pressed turf, various
woolen items, and even buying my mom a kitschy cottage scene to hang on her
wall. Not surprisingly, there were a lot of Yanks (besides myself) milling about.
The novel aspect of my forced shopping spree, through, was that this crowd was
composed mostly of 200 or so US Marines and Army Reservists (according to my
unscientific sample of conversations) in desert combat fatigues napping,
shopping, and drinking.  They were all on their way to Iraq, just shy of the second
anniversary of the invasion (19 March) and the hasty declaration of “mission
accomplished.”  I suspect that even the most gung-ho amongst them knew what
they were getting into – a long, drawn out, bloody occupation whose main
impetus now seems to be the inertia of its history rather than any coherent plan
of leaving the country in better shape than when the war started.  I wondered
how many of the faces I saw there were to end up as casualty figures scarcely
mentioned at home, and how many Iraqis they would kill during their foreign
tenure whom would never get counted at all.
I doubt that Middle Ireland has much of a sense of the importance of Shannon to
the supply line of the American occupation of Iraq.  Different political cultures
seem to produce forms of bad faith.  By bad faith, I mean a seeming contradiction
between what subjects see and what they profess.   In Ireland, for example, a
valorization of “neutrality” coexists more or less peacefully with such blatant
examples of its violation.  If such violations can be discretely hidden and little
media attention paid to them, however, other forms of bad faith seem in
comparison even more hypocritical, and therefore, oddly comforting.  Perhaps,
the most egregious form of bad faith connected to the Iraq War to date has been
the Abu Ghraib Prison scandal and the American reaction to it, for here, even the
worst critics of the Bush administration’s policies seemed to be shown to be naïve
idealists, and the proponents of the occupation to be at best the dupes of a
perverse and sadistic exercise in power.  It seemed to confirm the worst opinions
of the American invasion at large in much of Europe, but it did allow various
Anti-War coalitions a sort of consolation prize – the knowledge of having been
morally correct, making up a bit for our continued political impotence.
I begin this discussion of some new additions to what is now a sizeable
bibliography on just this aspect of the Iraq War1 with a mention of bad faith
because it seems to me that the willingness of vast swathes of democratic
electorates in very different countries to actively not see connections is a
significant feature of this conflict.  It is easy enough to hold the current American
administration in contempt (for the most part they richly deserve this censure),
but this sentiment obscures how even those who aver their opposition to this war
contribute to its continuation, and it also misses the myriad ways that bad faith
operates in the mechanics of hegemony.  It seems to me that this process is
fundamentally bound up with (what at least should be) important
anthropological problems, that is, how people reproduce systems of meaning and
power, how they imagine their world works and what they count as evidence for
these beliefs, and, finally, how they understand their own agency within
structures they experience as alienated from themselves. To help elaborate some
of these issues with respect to the American reaction to Abu Ghraib, I will also
discuss a recent volume by Angela Davis critically reviewing the penal system in
the United States, as a way of connecting the recent domestic “great
confinement” in America with the issue of the indefinite detainment of “Enemy
Combatants” in the current exercise of American might.
The Strasser and Danner volumes give as an exhaustive account as is currently
possible of the nature of the foreign archipelagoes of confinement that have
sprung up during the “war on terror.”  They show just how much documentation
of serious abuses exists that hovers at the edge of our consciousness of this
conflict.  Both volumes, not surprisingly, make grim reading, not just in the
details of torture, or in the legerdemain of politicians and pundits as to what
“abuse” actually means, but more importantly in their status as evidence of the
virtuoso management of “consent” for this undertaking (which, even in America,
had a sizeable plurality of the electorate opposed to the adventure, and which was
overwhelmingly opposed throughout Europe).  In the event, there are few
                                                 
1 According to my count there are nine books just on the prisoner issue in this new war, nearly all
of them focused on Abu Ghraib, a scandal that became public only at the end of April 2004
Several more books are on their way, including ones surveying the abuses at Guantanamo in
Cuba.  There have also been hundreds of articles appearing in nearly every conceivable publishing
venue (including most of one edition of the American Anthropologist Newsletter (Volume 45, No.
6, September 2004).  Finally, the internet hits for more informal writings, such as commentaries
and blogs, on these issues number in the thousands.  Factoring the new works on the potential
ethics of torture (e.g., Alan Dershowitz), there has been something of a publishing cottage
industry on the specifics of (and the theoretical justifications for) torture and abuse over the past
eighteen months (For a considered review of many of these works, see Hajjar 2005).
Consequently, any article surveying this field is always in danger of being overtaken by events.
Americans who know nothing about Abu Ghraib (and recognize that many such
centers must exist in other places in Iraq and even farther conceptually, if not
geographically, afield), but these revelations have only entrenched the opposition
of those already opposed to this adventure, while serving at best as an
opportunity for soul-searching (but not opposition) for even thoughtful
commentators originally in favour of the war.  For the majority of the American
electorate, however, Abu Ghraib barely registered as an aside in the last
presidential election. John Kerry scarcely acknowledged Abu Ghraib, for
example, and, after the initial revelations, political commentators on what passes
for the “Left” in the United States mentioned it only as one more deplorable
aspect of the war, less pressing for a typical American voter, perhaps, than
American dead and wounded and higher gas prices, but still bad.  I believe that,
as far as the last presidential election was concerned, the Kerry camp and its
allies reckoned (probably correctly) that this was not an issue of any great
importance to most Americans, especially to that stratum of the white working
class, who are disproportionately represented in the military, that both the
Republicans and Democrats were actively courting.  Oddly (or perhaps not), no
American commentator (to my knowledge) drew any connections between the
abuse’s violent sexual (often homoerotic) overtones and the passions aroused by
the 11 state constitutional amendments banning “gay marriage” in the so-called
swing states.
Nonetheless, the limited number of images that were released (and both texts
give a good sense of just how little of what went on in Abu Ghraib even now could
properly be called “public”) seemed to demand a more principled response than
glossing and denial, especially from those who supported the war who styled
themselves “intellectuals.”  Here another, more subtle form of bad faith makes
itself evident.  This form of bad faith seeks not to avoid questions, merely to
strictly limit their scope and the sort of issues they might raise.  Thus, the
traditional means of unraveling a “Scandal” immediately became preeminent in
the public production of Abu Ghraib in this section of American Punditry, that is
the apportioning of responsibility to individuals:  “what did they know?” and
“when did they know it?”  These answers inevitably involve (often complicated)
timelines, but they also allow for the mitigating factors of the limited conceptual
horizons of significant actors in the drama (with hindsight always metaphorically
positioned on higher ground), and they invariably reveal the pitfalls that lie
between the inspiration for “policy” (generally good and high-minded) and its
execution (always fraught, sometimes disastrously so).   Like Tolstoy’s aphorism
about happy people, though, the answers to these questions make poor
narratives, as their plot and characters tend to be numbingly similar, despite the
differences in surface detail.  For the current version of the Abu Ghraib narrative,
they involve the usual suspects of good leaders with limited information, petty
bureaucratic infighting, genuine confusion at nearly every command level as to
what (if anything) constituted “torture,” good people asked to do a tough job in a
fallen world, and which (possibly all) of the detainees were legitimate targets of
abuse. Aspects of this narrative have been intelligently enough examined by a
variety of commentators (Sullivan (January 30, 2005), Brooks (4 November
2003, 11 May, 2004), and I want to sketch out some of the issues they have
highlighted, if only partially, below.
 Just according to the narrow issue of “whose fault is it?” and “should someone be
fired, even prosecuted?,” the Strasser and Danner volumes read like
specifications in a set of charges that minimally should send the current Secretary
of Defense to the unemployment line.  While the available documentation makes
it impossible to know for certain if anyone in the administrations “planned” all
the terrible activities at Abu Ghraib (or Guantánamo, or the several other places
that even informed citizens would have difficulty listing), it is clear that members
of the Bush Administration, from the start, knew that their doctrine of
“preemptive” war was going to entail a different relationship to prisoners of these
new conflicts.  First, the polities in the bulls-eye of these crusaders for freedom
were seen to be either too dysfunctional or too illegitimate to treat as entities
similar to the US, and therefore the Geneva Conventions, understood as
agreements between states, were seen not to apply as law determining American
responsibilities to such prisoners.  Second (and more importantly), the legal wing
of this administration, predominantly recruited from the reactionary Federalist
Society, were vehemently opposed to the fundamental premise of international
law, that any internationally-derived statute had the ability to restrict American
Law or Policy.
Before Afghanistan and the Bush administration’s resolve to attack Iraq (almost
certainly no later than early 2002, possibly before September 2001), legal
opinions about the mechanics of these new conflicts were sought out by this
administration and duly provided by its appointees.  They seemed even better
tailored to the administration’s needs than the “Intelligence” which justified the
Iraq invasion.  Just one example from Strasser’s work will have to do for many: in
the run-up to the conflict, Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee (since
nominated to a federal Appellate court) analyzed the relevant statutes against
torture to see exactly how far the military could go in mistreating prisoners
without blatant illegality. His answer was, not surprisingly, expansive.  His
strategy was an interesting one, however.   He actually tracked closely to the idea
of “humane” treatment in the Geneva Conventions, but widened the gray area
between such treatment and “torture” by almost ludicrously restricting its
legitimate definition, on the one hand, and expanding the idea of military
necessity, on the other.  Thus, he asserted that the president was within his legal
rights to permit his military surrogates to inflict  “cruel, inhuman or degrading”
treatment on prisoners without violating strictures against torture. For an act of
abuse to be considered torture, the abuser must be inflicting pain “of such a high
level of intensity that the pain is difficult for the subject to endure.” If the abuser
is doing this to get information, and not merely for sadistic enjoyment, then
“even if the defendant knows that severe pain will result from his actions,” he is
not guilty of torture per se.  Beating prisoners is not torture either: thus, Bybee
argues that a case of kicking an inmate in the stomach, while the prisoner is in a
kneeling position does not by itself rise to the level of torture. Finally, he even
suggests that full-fledged “torture” of inmates (whose definition by now must be
horrific indeed) might be still be legitimate because it could be construed as “self-
defense,” on the grounds that “the threat of an impending terrorist attack
threatens the lives of hundreds if not thousands of American citizens.”  Clearly,
torture could be justified almost anywhere “on the battlefield” in the war on
terror because, as we know this new, seemingly permanent, state of war is
“everywhere,” and we are all foot soldiers in it.  Only the president’s discretion,
we are told, forbade such activities, not international law or evolving standards of
decency.  These guidelines were only formally repudiated by the administration
the week before Alberto Gonzales’s appearance before the Senate Judiciary
Committee for confirmation as Attorney-General, but what (if any) legal limits
exist to abusive treatment of prisoners, according to the Bush Administration, is
still, at best, vague.2
The results of these directives, combined with increasing casualties, and the odd
defensive posture that all armies of occupation seem to develop – an anger about
the lack of gratitude amongst those whom they are occupying – led to, what
should have been, fairly predictable results.  Again, one example from the Army’s
investigation into Abu Ghraib, led by Lt. Gen. Anthony R. Jones and Maj. Gen.
George R. Fay, cited by Strasser, will have to do for many: “On another occasion
DETAINEE-07 was forced to lie down while M.P.’s jumped onto his back and
legs. He was beaten with a broom and a chemical light was broken and poured
over his body. . . . During this abuse a police stick was used to sodomize
DETAINEE-07 and two female M.P.’s were hitting him, throwing a ball at his
penis, and taking photographs.”  I was resident in the United States when these
stories, if not the actual pictures,3 became public, and for the most part, the
reactions were muted.  Much more attention, for example, was paid to the
credibility of John Kerry’s three Purple Hearts or the shoddiness of the
incumbent’s service in the Texas Air National Guard in a war more than thirty
years old than in examining this issue.  Lynndie England, one of the American
women who was involved in (and clearly seemed to enjoy) much of the abuse did
for a moment emerge as the trailer park female anti-hero to the previously
                                                 
2 Given this publicly produced contempt for international legal standards, one can only admire
the hutzpah of US Legal team invoking the Geneva Conventions prohibition against the
humiliation of prisoners when defending the Bush Administration’s rejection of the ACLU’s
Freedom of Information request for the release of more photographs and videos from Abu
Ghraib.  In the event, this strategy was unsuccessful, so barring the Supreme Court agreeing to
hear the case, at least 100 more photographs and two more videos will be in the public domain by
July 05.
3 The best-known pictures from Abu Ghraib seem to have all been taken on one night, and the
best-known of these, the hooded man on some crates threatened with electrical shocks, however
disturbing, show what is clearly amongst the least reprehensible activities that are documented.
Many prisoners, for example, died under “interrogation” (in other words were tortured to death).
Their exact number is unknown, but it may well run into scores, and, of course, we have only a
portion of the evidence available for public inspection.  The overtly sexualized nature of the
violence, moreover, has only been hinted at in the mass media, but was clearly an important
theme in prisoner mistreatment (For a very early analysis of the scale (and nature) of the abuse,
see Human Rights Watch 2004, also 2005).
valorized Jessica Lynch,4 but the issue of torture-as-American-policy seemed to
barely register.
This looks a lot like bad faith – knowing something is there and pretending that it
is not, perhaps, at best, hoping that it will all go away.  A review of the first two
volumes, then, could legitimately end at this point.  Americans, individually and
collectively, look pretty bad in all this, but, oddly enough, America as a country
does not.  Abu Ghraib looks like an aberration, albeit a horrible one, but one
whose exposure shows the functioning of America’s military as more or less
ethical, and, further, the fact of the investigation provides evidence of the United
States’s status as an open society.  With its high ideals tarnished by a few bad
apples, America still must show the moral fortitude to “stay the course” and build
a democratic Iraq to provide a happy dénouement to this unfortunate chapter in
“our” history.
There is, however, a second set of questions that might be asked about Abu
Ghraib.   These look not at its exotic qualities, but at its more mundane ones.
This set of questions focuses not on the military aspect of these centers of
confinement, but on their existence as prisons.  There have been only sporadic
efforts to connect Abu Ghraib and the activities of other centers of detention in
the Iraq and Afghanistan adventures with the domestic prison system (and
broader economic issues) in the United States.5  Because of the writings of Naomi
Klein and a few other authors, for example, at least some people by now are
aware that both Army Specialists Graner and Frederick, two members of the unit
(the 372nd Military Police Company) involved in the activities in most of the
widely-known pictures, had backgrounds in the Corrections System in the US,
but little beyond this connection has been developed, and it certainly has not
                                                 
4 Jessica Lynch is a female private from very humble roots in West Virginia who was severely
wounded when her convoy was attacked and more or less destroyed in the early stages of the war.
She was turned over, in critical condition, to an Iraqi hospital whose personnel treated her as best
they were able, given the scarcity of supplies, and informed the Americans of her presence.  Iraqi
medical personnel then tried to return her to a US position but were driven back by small arms
fire. She was subsequently “rescued” from her situation by American Special Forces who
conveniently filmed their assault.  Beyond these “facts” much is hazy about her story.  The
American military initially produced her as a sort of female Rambo who left a wall of dead Iraqis
around her position until she ran out of ammunition.  It turned out that her weapon had not been
fired, but some aspects of this story might have applied to one of her colleagues, a Panamanian-
American woman, Shoshana Johnson (who was also severely wounded in the attack).  The Army
then retracted this story, but insisted that Lynch was, in fact, being mistreated by Iraqi
interrogators when she was rescued (in particular that she had been sodomized).  This story, too,
has been challenged, but still hovers around the official version of events, and is supported by her
biographer.   As Lynch was unconscious during much of the ordeal, no definitive version emerged,
but all commentators agreed that she was a Real American Hero, and, in the event, her “story”
was quickly produced in a made-for-TV movie.
5 An important exception to this statement is the prison reform/activist literature that has been
highly critical of America’s new Great Confinement since the days of the Reagan Administration.
Amongst more mainstream authors, it is really only Naomi Klein (e.g., Guardian Unlimited, May
18, 2004) who has expressly connected America’s carceral infrastructure, its macroeconomic
trends, and some of the more unsavoury aspects of the war in Iraq or the general War on Terror
(see also, Dow 2004, Elsner 2005).
been produced as part of “the scandal at Abu Ghraib” in the sense that I use the
term above.
Some liberal punditry in the US has, however, been more attracted to the human
side of this drama. Charles Graner, for example, has garnered some notoriety for his
taste in attack dogs, his obvious relish for inflicting pain and humiliation, as well as
for one of the women in his life (he and Lynndie England now have a baby together,
with some of their sex acts also apparently having been recorded for posterity).
This part of the story, though, ends with a whimper, as, in the end, Graner put up a
very weak defence to the charges of prisoner abuse, quietly accepting a
dishonourable discharge and a ten-year prison sentence (out of a potential fifteen),
despite the extensive documentation available that seemingly should have allowed
him to implicate officers far higher up the chain of command to mitigate his own
guilt.6
What makes Graner more interesting, it seems to me, are his more quotidian
qualities.  A long-time member of the National Guard and involved at entry-level
jobs in a couple of prisons in Pennsylvania and West Virginia, this is a man used to
taking orders.7  It is hard to believe that he would have initiated either the elaborate
staging, or the extensive documentation of this abuse unless he thought these
activities were condoned, even encouraged.  According to a now infamous
Washington Post piece, cited in the Strasser volume (as well as in The Road to Abu
Ghraib by Human Rights Watch, amongst many others), one sergeant who
witnessed the torture thought Military Intelligence did indeed approve of all of it:
“The M.I. staffs, to my understanding, have been giving Graner compliments on the
way he has been handling the M.I. holds [i.e., prisoners held by military
intelligence].” Example being statements like “Good job, they’re breaking down real
fast”; “They answer every question;” “They’re giving out good information, finally;”
and “Keep up the good work” – stuff like that.” And, indeed, there is a variety of
documents (as well as the testimony of some of those Americans accused of
mistreating prisoners) showing that these individuals felt they were acting within
the framework of directives from Washington.
Nonetheless, as far as the official voices in America are concerned, the search for
“Scandal” at Abu Ghraib ends at this point: a couple of enlisted personnel have
been charged with “abuse” and duly punished, one general in direct control of the
prisons in Iraq, Gen. Janis Kaminski, has received a written reprimand for her
                                                 
6 Given the history of Americans imprisoned for military crimes connected to mistreating or
killing enemy soldiers or civilians, it is unlikely that Graner will serve anywhere near his full term.
7 I have no desire to reproduce the classist depictions of the 372 nd MP Company.  Such depictions
of out-of-control white trash are already disturbingly common, connecting the “Left” and “Right”
sides of this issue in the US.  Liberal writers, like Seymour Hersh, who originally broke the Abu
Ghraib story in a mainstream publication, for example, argued that these soldiers were too poor
and uneducated to have thought up this stuff by themselves, therefore, they must have had
directions from their betters.  The right-wing commentators who have absorbed the seriousness
of the abuse at Abu Ghraib make much of the number of trailer-parks in the backgrounds of these
soldiers, implicitly constructing these people as bad-apple “crackers” pulling down the reputation
of “our” glorious army.
negligence, as well as a demotion to Colonel (effectively ending her career in the
military).  The rest of the chain of command has been officially absolved of
wrong-doing.  The disturbing question, “Was/Is there an American policy
allowing for, even encouraging, torture?” however, remains elusive, refractory to
definitive answer.  The connection of Abu Ghraib to anything found in America,
furthermore, seems impossible to imagine.  “Scandal” in this sense is like a storm,
something to be weathered, and something fated to subside.
It is impossible, however, to read Angela Davis’s illuminating analysis of why so
many Americans are imprisoned by other Americans, in so many brutal and
violent places, and be satisfied with such an understanding of Abu Ghraib.  Only
months before the “breaking” of the Abu Ghraib story (but with stories of the
abuse of detainees having obtained the status of persistent rumour, Davis penned
a pithy Prison Abolitionist Manifesto, a state of affairs difficult to imagine at the
present moment, but from her perspective, the necessary theoretical stance from
which to view the prison system in the United States as a system.  Understanding
the system of domestic imprisonment, it seems to me, takes us a long way
towards understanding many aspects of the current military interventions in both
Afghanistan and Iraq.
Davis’s starting point is the sheer size of the carceral infrastructure in the United
States.  As of 2003, America had more than 2.1 million men, women, and
children in prison, jails, and detention centers, and this number swells yearly.
The total population of prisoners on the planet in the early years of this new
millennium, however, has hovered around 9 million.  To put it another way, with
less than one twentieth of the world’s population, the United States now has
nearly one quarter of the global population of prisoners, with that proportion
looking likely to increase in the next few years.
Despite this prison-building boom, overcrowding continues to worsen, and
violence and brutality in American prisons remains a persistent, if largely hidden,
and certainly under-investigated, problem.  There is not the space in this piece to
examine the issue of sexualized violence in prisons, but its reality is undeniable
and the threat of particularly dangerous prisons or prison blocks remains an
effective means of securing intelligence or punishing rebellion from inmates
inside, or from people in trouble with the law outside.  The signatures of this sort
of violence can be seen in various corners of popular culture, from off-hand
references in everything from Gangsta Rap to the middle-class-directed Law and
Order.  It is documented in ethnographic depictions of populations with
experience of regular imprisonment (Bourgeois 2002, Fliesher 1995).  Its more
direct reality is revealed in the occasional scandal, such as in 1997, when Haitian
immigrant Abner Louima was beaten and sodomized with a broomstick in
bathroom of precinct stationhouse while in the custody of the 70th Precinct of the
New York Police Department, an incident with disturbing resonances to the
abuse at Abu Ghraib.8
As Davis also points out, the United States has been the global leader in ceding
prison and security services to private for-profit corporations.  Many low- and
medium-security facilities and even a few high-security ones, for example, are
now run as private enterprises, some quite profitably.  Indeed, this connection
between mass incarceration of poor (often black and brown) men and women,
the expansion of budgets to build and run prisons (often in the face of shrinking
government commitments to health, education, and welfare), and the successful
reproduction of private capital around and within prisons has become so tightly
bound together that many activists and some social scientists now speak of a
“prison mode of production” or the “gulag economy.”  In this cycle of public-
private capital flows, land (often formerly agricultural land no longer profitable
for corporate farming, generally in areas losing population and tax base) is
purchased at above-market value from its private owners, a lavish building
developed, and a large, captive (generally urban) population in need of (at least)
basic services introduced.  This process creates jobs (often more unionized than
the rest of the so-called unskilled economy, and certainly more recession-proof).
These jobs are disproportionately filled by the white working class, whose
traditional route into the middle classes has been severely restricted by the
outsourcing of lower-skilled, but, in the previous generation, reasonably well-
paid, unionized manufacturing jobs.  Prison Reformer, Van Jones, for example,
points out that Spc. Frederick at Abu Ghraib had a decent job at the Bausch &
Lomb factory in Mountain Lake, Md., until it shut down and moved to Mexico -
one of the nearly 900,000 jobs that the Economic Policy Institute estimates have
been lost since NAFTA. Indeed, Klein has called the attractiveness of the military
for folks like England, Graner and Frederick, especially the often-oversold college
assistance supposedly available after one’s military enlistment is over, the
“NAFTA draft” (Klein 2005).
This sort of merging of state, economy, and civil society under the aegis of
corporate governance goes some way to making sense of an extremely interesting,
but very under-examined, aspect of the War on Terror, that is, the proliferation of
private “security” options in both Afghanistan and Iraq.  This odd mixture, from
the perspective of bourgeois political theory, which posits obvious boundaries
between the state, the economy, and civil society, was clearly field-tested in the
US Prison System.  Major corporations, like Wackenhut, for example, have been
running large, uniformed, generally armed, private security forces and full-scale
centers of confinement in the US for more than a decade.  This recent history of
the US prison system inflects the interpretation of some facts that have emerged
out of the Abu Ghraib “scandal.”  At least four out of the six prison governors in
Iraq, for example, come from state prison systems in the US, with accusations of
                                                 
8 The situation at the NYPD’s 70 th Precinct where this assault occurred was almost too bizarre for
fiction.  One of the accused Officers, Justin Volpe, pleaded an insanity defense in his criminal
trial, that he was in a fit of “‘roid rage.”  Further investigation yielded evidence of an active, police-
led drug ring, with anabolic steroids being especially popular with the cops in the 70th.
ignoring brutality in their careers.  To be sure, such a background might have
desensitized them to the abuses in Iraqi prisons.  More importantly, however, it
probably tended to normalize this merging of state servants and private
contractors that has made the apportioning of blame much higher than the
Privates who physically meted out the torment such a difficult task for the
investigators of the activities at Abu Ghraib.9
This contracting out of aspects of the state’s monopoly on legitimate violence has
garnered nowhere near the attention that it deserves.  We are not talking about
numerically small, elite forces like the English-based Executive Outcomes,
subverting or supporting shaky state structures in Africa, but the widespread use
of “private contractors” in the biggest deployment of the largest military
establishment in the world for more than thirty years. In the War on Terror,
“Private Contractors” now guard both military and civilian sites, provide support
services, patrol hostile territory, engage in firefights, and even run certain prisons
and collect intelligence.  In short, their functions are practically indistinguishable
from those of national militaries.  It is impossible to get a reliable estimate of
these forces, but they are only exceeded by the American and, and perhaps the
British,10 contingent in the “Coalition of the Willing.”  They have certainly been
useful to “real” military planners who did not anticipate the ability of despised
“Rag-heads” and “Hadjis”11 to resist shock and awe tactics.  They also provide
plausible deniability for military and civilian leaders when a scandal is uncovered
(as recently occurred in a prison in Afghanistan).  Finally, they represent a pool of
people to put in harm’s way who do not need to be counted as casualties on the
evening news, if things should happen to go wrong.12
                                                 
9 One of the persistent rumours that the United States Military has been keen to deny, for
example, is the presence of Israeli Military Intelligence during the mistreatment at Abu Ghraib.
Certain practices that Detainees have experienced at American hands, such as water-boarding
(simulated drowning), and hooding (faeces-soiled sacks covering the head for many hours) have
been well documented in Israeli Defence Forces and Christian Militia mistreatment of prisoners
in southern Lebanon, although these and other equally unsavoury techniques have also been in
CIA “training manuals” in the public domain for decades.  The normalization of “private
contractors” in the war on terror, especially the easy movement of skilled soldiers between
military and militarised civilian employment, however, makes the presence or absence of foreign
military personnel difficult to determine and nearly impossible to prove.  Like the Academy, the
American Military has learned the value of short-term contract workers in making themselves
more competitive in the global marketplace.  The current contracting out of the harsher
interrogations that we are witnessing in the US to countries like Jordan and Saudi Arabia, with
fewer legal protections for detainees, is so similar to corporate outsourcing of production
processes that are too dangerous and/or too environmentally unsound, for American laws, as to
need little elaboration.
10 The estimates of these forces, like nearly all the other numbers connected to this war, are
subject to much debate.  The highest figures available are upwards of 20,000 armed mercenaries
(out of 40,000 or so private employees in the deployment).  The former figure would be about
double the current British contingent, the only other significant military force in this “coalition”
besides the American one.  For an outline of this privatization of the means of waging war, see
Singer 2004.
11 These terms of abuse are currently popular with those administering the American occupation.
12 The first Coalition assault on Falujah was, of course precipitated by the killing and post-mortem
mutilation of four such armed “contractors.”  These mercenaries were operating in circumstances
De-exoticising Abu Ghraib, then, requires the recognition of what has become
“normal,” not just in the “War on Terror,” not only in the US, but throughout the
world: tightly integrated flows of capital, symbols, peoples and commodities, an
enormous imbalance in military power, astonishing levels of technical virtuosity,
and vast and widening inequalities both within and between polities (as well as
the necessity of the security muscle to maintain this state of affairs), the whole of
which is increasingly under corporate governance.  These are rapidly becoming
the primary structures in which we live.  The photographs at Abu Ghraib of white
prison guards abusing brown prisoners and its subsequent management as
“scandal” strike a cord in all this for various reasons.  At least in the US, they
produce visual evidence of a situation that we regularly misrecognize, that is, just
how common this color-coded prison tableau is in modern America, if not in all
its ugly detail, then in its general outline.  Like all images returned from
repression, though, the images from Abu Ghraib are also eerily recognizable for
consumers who may have no first-, or even second-, hand experience of
America’s vast carceral infrastructure.  Rush Limbaugh, the conservative radio
talk-show host, for example, saw simple college fraternity hazing practices in the
human pyramid of abject naked Iraqis being surveyed by a grinning US MPs.  The
question is not the sincerity of his depiction (or indeed the level of humiliation
Rush endured to be “accepted” by other males in his youth).  Instead, it is the
persuasiveness of this argument of images (to use James Fernandez’s apt
phrasing) for Rush’s legions of listeners.  Even more interesting, perhaps, are
examples, in the wake of the “revelations,” of what seems to be the new way that
the culture-at-large exorcises the spectres of the zeitgeist.  Reality Television, at
least in Europe, is now making space for the torture of “real” people, as if the rag-
heads and Hadjis in these pictures are movie stars, in the same way that it
normalized the ubiquity of surveillance technologies a few years ago in the odious
Big Brother.  These new archipelagoes of confinement and the circulation of
images about them, then, stand as points of eruption of flows of people, capital,
commodities, and symbols, that are generally invisible and taken for granted.
This aspect of “the scandal” makes the current imbalance between the published
information on such places as Abu Ghraib and anything that can rightfully be
called theorizing about this mass of information, in William James’s sense of a
stubborn attempt to think clearly about something, even harder to understand.
It seems to me that the beginning of this theorizing of Abu Ghraib starts from
recognizing its crucial positioning at the intersection of domestic and foreign
fears in the United States. Abu Ghraib is the offspring of the political marriage of
those sections of American society doing well on the back of widening domestic
inequalities, who are committed to American unilateralism (if not imperialism) in
                                                                                                                                                  
that were never clarified.  This assault encountered stiff resistance and was discontinued after US
casualties began to mount.  After the Presidential Election in the US, Falujah was subsequently all
but destroyed in an “all out” assault that (according to official estimates) claimed the lives of over
one thousand insurgents.  Many times that number of Iraqi civilians must have died in the
widespread destruction of a city that before the conflict numbered nearly 300,000 people, but no
count of this total has been made public.
foreign affairs, and the post-1984 Christian Right, with its attendant “tough on
crime” stance at home, its lionization of Zionism abroad, and its epistemological
literalism throughout.  These two lines of force in modern American society are
connected, albeit unequally, to interlocking and unstable material and symbolic
economies.  The first a corporate-led global capitalism caught between the
exporting of decent jobs and the importing of cheap goods, finite resources, and a
shaky reserve currency, on the one hand, and, on the other, a symbolic economy
involved in a never-ending search for, and fight against, external, personifiable
evil as the privileged means of reducing social and personal anxiety.  In this
historical moment, tragedy and farce are interestingly telescoped.  Indeed, the
current situation produces a surfeit of the raw material for irony – a formerly
AWOL commander-in-chief declaring “mission accomplished,” when the local
resistance to his military adventure is intensifying; or the solemn declaration of
the “end of torture chambers in the new Iraq” almost at the very moment that the
Abu Ghraib scandal was breaking – but it seems to restrict the subject positions
for the consumption of such tropes.  A discipline which prides itself on its interest
in the functioning and reproduction of systems of meaning and power, of the
relationship, in the life-world of individuals, of motivations, actions, and
reflection, and of the interconnection of people, images and processes in our
current moment of globalization should have ample ground to till here.
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